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Canada’s	 leading	 environmental	 law	 scholars	 have	 identified	Harper’s	 legacy	 as	 a	 full-
scale	attack	on	the	environment,2	one	that	simultaneously	diminished	the	federal	government’s	
role	 in	 environmental	 protection	 and	 sought	 to	 increase	 federal	 influence	 over	 resource	
development.	 Indeed,	 the	 list	 of	measures	 and	 actions	 taken	 by	 the	Harper	 government	 that	
undermine	environmental	 protection	 is	 striking:	 The	 federal	 role	 in	 conducting	 environmental	
assessment	 was	 radically	 reduced3	as	 was	 its	 role	 in	 protecting	 navigable	 waters.4	Fisheries	
protections	 were	 narrowed. 5 	New	 regulation-making	 authority	 was	 exempt	 from	 ordinary	
procedural	 requirements,	 for	 no	 apparent	 reason.6	Ocean	 dumping	 controls	 were	 relaxed.7	
Critical	 habitat	 requirements	 for	 species	 at	 risk	were	 loosened.8	The	 government	 systemically	































the	National	 Energy	Board	 to	 federal	Cabinet.12	The	National	Roundtable	on	Environment	and	
Economy,	 a	 government	 advisory	 body	 on	 sustainable	 development,	 was	 disbanded. 13	
Environmental	 non-governmental	 organizations	were	 targeted	 for	 auditing	 on	 their	 charitable	
status.14	The	 Experimental	 Lakes	 Area,	 a	 world-class	 research	 facility,	 was	 defunded.15	Library	
materials	from	Fisheries	and	Oceans	Canada	were	destroyed.16	The	RCMP	and	CSIS	engaged	 in	
coordinated,	 covert	 surveillance	 of	 peaceful	 activities	 by	 environmental	 and	 Indigenous	
groups.17	Government	 scientists	 were	 muzzled.18	The	 budgets	 for	 Environment	 Canada	 and	
Fisheries	and	Oceans	were	slashed.19	
	
Collectively	 these	measures	 result	 in	 a	 radical	 reduction	 of	 the	 federal	 government’s	
role	in	environmental	protection.	They	appear	to	reflect	an	assumption	of	a	zero-sum	trade-off	
between	 resource	 development	 and	 environmental	 protection.	 Others	 have	 argued	 they	 are	
part	of	a	concerted	effort	to	subsume	“the	environment”	under	“a	singular	resource	extraction	
paradigm.”20	The	argument	advanced	here	is	that	that	the	precise	changes	to	environment	law	
not	only	 reflect	 this	 substantive	vision	of	 the	environment,	 they	also	 represent	an	attempt	 to	
exempt	 environmental	 decisions	 from	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 Underlying	 this	
argument	 is	 the	 premise	 that	 a	 democratic	 government	 committed	 to	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 must	































reasonableness.	 This	 rule-of-law	 requirement	 is	 most	 clearly	 reflected	 in	 section	 1	 of	 the	
Charter,	 but	 is	 also	 the	 core	 commitment	 contained	 within	 our	 common	 law	 constitution,	
realized,	in	part,	through	the	courts’	administrative	law	function	of	judicial	review.21		
	
The	 obligation	 to	 give	 publicly-regarding	 reasons	 (i.e.	 reasons	 that	 are	 not	 solely	 self-
interested	and	that	can	be	accepted	by	others)	is	also	the	consensus	point	amongst	theorists	of	
deliberative	democracy,	who	espouse	“an	ideal	of	politics	where	people	routinely	relate	to	one	
another…	 by	 influencing	 each	 other	 through	 the	 publicly	 valued	 use	 of	 reasoned	 argument,	
evidence,	evaluation	and	persuasion.”22	Thus	 the	 requirement	of	public	 justification	 lies	at	 the	
intersection	of	the	rule	of	 law	and	deliberative	democracy.23	Public	 justification	takes	seriously	
the	 capacity	 of	 legal	 subjects—those	 subject	 to	 the	 law—to	 “reason	 with	 the	 law.”24	It	 both	





The	 crux	 of	 this	 article	 is	 that	 environmental	 assessment	 law	 provides	 an	 essential	
framework	 for	 publicly-justified	 decision-making	 in	 the	 Canadian	 environmental	 context.	 This	







protection,	 and	 a	 capitulation	 to	 the	 federal	 government’s	 resource	 development	 agenda.	
Furthermore,	 environmental	 assessment	 laws	 are	 often	 thought	 of	 as	 the	 “mainframe	 of	
environmental	 law.”25	Indeed,	 as	 I	 suggest	 in	 this	 article,	 environmental	 assessment	 presently	
















environmental	 decision-making	 that	 reflects	 a	 narrow,	 resource-oriented	 vision	 of	 the	
environment,	 and	 second,	 a	 legacy	 of	 undermining	 democratic	 and	 rule-of-law	 values	 in	
environmental	 law.	 This	 argument	 unfolds	 through	 three	 parts.	 The	 first	 part	 introduces	 the	
basic	 structure,	 purpose	 and	 practice	 of	 environmental	 assessment.	 It	 argues	 that	
environmental	assessment	 is	best	understood	as	providing	a	framework	for	public	 justification	
in	environmental	decision-making.	And	it	identifies	how	a	misunderstanding	of	this	justificatory	
function	 paved	 the	way	 for	 criticism—from	 all	 sides—of	 Canadian	 environmental	 assessment	
law.	 The	 second	 part	 introduces	 Harper’s	 major	 changes	 to	 Canadian	 environmental	
assessment.	Drawing	on	existing	 literature,	 it	 argues	 that	one	aspect	of	 the	changes	 is	poorer	
environmental	decisions.	The	reduction	in	the	scope	and	rigour	of	environmental	assessment	in	
Canada	 leaves	 our	 public	 decision-makers	 less	 informed	 about	 the	 environmental	 effects	 of	
their	decisions.	The	third	part	extends	on	this	existing	environmental	commentary.	It	argues	that	
the	changes	to	federal	environmental	assessment	undermine	the	federal	government’s	ability	to	
offer	 adequate	 justification	 for	 its	 environmental	 decision,	 and	 thus	 suggest	 an	 attempt	 to	
exempt	the	government	from	the	ongoing	project	of	democratic	governance	under	the	rule	of	








the	 potential	 environmental	 effects	 of	 certain	 activities	 (e.g.	 developing	 a	 new	mine)	 before	
deciding	 whether	 these	 activities	 are	 allowed	 to	 proceed.	 It	 formalizes	 the	 common	 sense	
notion	 that	 we	 ought	 to	 ‘look	 before	 we	 leap’.	 The	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Canada	 has	 described	
environmental	 assessment	 as	 “a	 planning	 tool	 that	 is	 now	 generally	 regarded	 as	 an	 integral	
component	of	sound	decision-making.”26	What	these	benign	descriptions	belie,	however,	is	the	
fact	that	environmental	assessment	carries	the	weight	of	much	of	the	hope	and	expectation	for	
environmental	 law	 more	 generally.	 Environmental	 assessment	 is	 intended	 to	 promote	
sustainable	development,27	facilitate	consultation	with	aboriginal	peoples,	coordinate	decision-
making	 between	 levels	 of	 government,	 and	 encourage	 public	 participation.28	But	 it	 is	 also	 an	
attempt	 to	 regularize	 and	 channel	 that	 which	 cannot	 easily	 be	 tamed.	 The	 very	 nature	 of	














In	 broad	 strokes,	 environmental	 assessment	 is	 generally	 comprised	 of	 anticipation,	
participation	and	the	determination	of	whether	a	proposal	is	 likely	to	cause	significant	adverse	
environmental	 effects.	 Environmental	 assessment	 requires	 gathering	 information	 about	 the	
project	 and	 its	 possible	 effects	 in	 order	 to	 anticipate	 the	 environmental	 consequences	 of	
approving	the	project.	It	typically	includes	some	form	of	public	participation,	which	incorporates	
information	 from	a	 range	of	 sources.	The	extent	and	depth	of	 the	assessment	varies	with	 the	
nature	 of	 the	 proposed	 project.	 Major	 development	 proposals	 attract	 more	 rigorous	
assessments	 than	 minor	 proposals.	 The	 end	 result	 of	 the	 assessment	 is	 a	 determination	 of	
whether	 the	 proposal	 is	 likely	 to	 cause	 significant	 adverse	 environmental	 effects,	 and	 if	 so,	
whether	 the	 project	 can	 nonetheless	 be	 justified. 29 	Because	 of	 this	 final	 determination,	
environmental	 assessment	 does	 not	 require	 decision-makers	 to	 reach	 any	 particular	 outcome	
(i.e.	even	projects	with	significant	negative	effects	may	be	justified	and	then	approved).	For	this	
reason,	environmental	 assessment	 is	often	characterized	as	essentially	procedural	 in	nature.30	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 however,	 environmental	 assessment	 serves	 (or	 ought	 to	 serve)	 underlying	
substantive	 objectives	 by	 providing	 a	 forum	 for	 explicitly	 considering	 whether	 the	 risks	 of	
projects	are	acceptable	and	whether	proposals	reflect	the	best	use	of	our	land	and	resources.31	









for	 the	 decision-maker’s	 determination	 of	 whether	 a	 project	 ought	 to	 proceed	 and	 on	 what	
conditions.	 In	 the	 Canadian	 context,	 one	 need	 not	 look	 further	 than	 the	 language	 of	 the	




















the	 operation	 of	 the	 project.	 There	 is	 an	 additional	 and	 significant	 distinction,	 at	 least	 in	 the	
Canadian	context,	in	that	environmental	regulatory	decisions	do	not,	at	present,	fulfill	the	rule-
of-law	requirement	of	public	 justification.	Regulatory	decisions	at	the	federal	 level	(e.g.	 issuing	
pollution	 permits,	 or	 authorizations	 to	 destroy	 fish	 habitat)	 are	 not,	 generally	 speaking,	
transparent,	publicly	accessible,	 reasoned,	or	 subject	 to	any	meaningful	 form	of	 review.35	This	
means	 that,	 in	Canada,	 environmental	 assessment	 is	 the	primary	means	by	which	 the	 federal	
government	 meets	 its	 rule-of-law	 obligation	 to	 publicly	 justify	 its	 environmental	 decisions.	
Environmental	assessment	can	thus	be	understood	as	having	a	quasi-constitutional	role	because	
it	provides	 the	means	through	which	the	government	can	 fulfill	 its	constitutional	obligation	to	
govern	according	to	the	rule	of	law.	
	
The	 courts,	 however,	 have	 largely	 overlooked	 this	 justificatory	 function	 and	 have	
instead	 viewed	 environmental	 assessment	 in	 largely	 technical	 and	 formal	 terms.	 The	 first	
Supreme	Court	of	Canada	decision	on	environmental	assessment	upheld	an	expansive	role	 for	
the	 federal	 government	 in	 conducting	 environmental	 assessment,	 even	 when	 predicted	
environmental	 effects	 pertained	 to	 matters	 of	 provincial	 jurisdiction.36		 At	 the	 same	 time,	
however,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 emphasized	 the	 essentially	 procedural	 nature	 of	 environmental	
assessment.	 Indeed	 a	 key	 distinction	 for	 the	 Court,	 between	 environmental	 assessment	 and	
regulation	(such	as	the	Fisheries	Act)	was	that	the	former	“is	fundamentally	procedural	while	the	
other	 is	 substantive	 in	 nature.”37	The	 Federal	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 has	 a	 long	 history	 of	 narrowly	
interpreting	 the	 requirements	 of	 environmental	 assessment	 legislation.	 Prominent	 decisions	
include	 deference	 to	 federal	 decision-makers	 narrowly	 “scoping”	 the	 proposed	 project	 to	















entire	 logging	 operation),38	and	 holding	 that	 an	 assessment	 will	 be	 unreasonable	 only	 if	 the	
decision-maker	 “gave	no	 consideration	 at	 all	 to	 [the]	 environmental	 effects.”39	More	 recently,	
the	Federal	Court	upheld	as	reasonable	the	Governor	in	Council’s	determination	that	the	effects	
of	 the	 Site	C	Dam	were	 “justified	 in	 the	 circumstances,”	 despite	 the	 fact	 the	decision	did	not	
explain	in	any	fashion	the	basis	for	that	conclusion.40			
	
Construed	 as	 a	 formal	 pre-approval	 exercise,	 rather	 than	 a	 rule-of-law	 imperative,	
environmental	assessment	is	easily	vulnerable	to	criticism.	Environmental	groups	argue	that	it	is	
toothless	and	unmoored	from	advancing	underlying	substantive	environmental	goals.41	Industry	
highlights	 its	 ineffectiveness	 at	 achieving	 environmental	 outcomes	 and	 argues	 that	
environmental	 assessment	 is	 wasteful,	 burdensome	 and	 leads	 to	 costly	 delays	 to	
development.42		 Joe	 Oliver,	 the	Minister	 of	 Natural	 Resources	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 changes	 to	
federal	environmental	assessment	 law,	stated	“[u]nfortunately,	our	 inefficient,	duplicative	and	







Harper’s	 changes	 to	 the	 federal	 environmental	 assessment	 occurred	 in	 two	 waves.	 First	 the	
2010	 Budget	 Implementation	 Bill	 (Bill	 C-9)	 amended	 the	Canadian	 Environmental	 Assessment	
Act	 (CEAA)	 to	 increase	 the	 discretionary	 powers	 of	 Ministers	 conducting	 environmental	
assessments44	and	 to	 streamline	 various	 procedures.45	In	 addition,	 the	 bill	 exempted	 from	























assessment	 in	2012.	After	an	abridged	 legislative	review,	conducted	over	only	a	 few	weeks	by	
the	Standing	Committee	on	Environment	and	Sustainable	Development,	the	repeal	of	CEAA	and	
enactment	 of	 CEAA	 2012	 were	 proposed	 in	 the	 2012	 Budget	 Implementation	 Bill	 (Bill	 C-38).	
After	only	two	months	in	the	House	of	Commons	and	the	rejection	of	all	proposed	amendments	




The	 previous	 version	 of	 CEAA	 was	 by	 no	 means	 perfect.49	But	 the	 2012	 changes	 to	
environmental	assessment	are	a	dramatic	retreat	in	the	face	of	strong	international	trends	and	
academic	commentary	in	favour	of	a	gradually	expanding	role	for	environmental	assessment	in	
terms	 of	 proposals	 considered,	 public	 participation	 and	 the	 objectives	 served.50	For	 example,	
experience	 with	 project-specific	 environmental	 assessment	 revealed	 the	 need	 for	 strategic	
environmental	assessment	of	higher-level	policy	and	programmatic	decisions	in	order	to	assess	
social	 and	 environmental	 effects	 systematically	 rather	 than	 through	 a	 piecemeal,	 project-by-
project	approach.51		
	
In	 contrast	 to	 this	 trend	 of	 inclusivity,	 Harper’s	 rewriting	 of	 federal	 environmental	
assessment	created	a	highly	exclusive	assessment	regime.	This	part	focuses	on	three	major	ways	
in	which	federal	environmental	assessment	was	narrowed.	52	First,	the	Act	substantially	reduces	
the	 number	 of	 projects	 that	 require	 an	 environmental	 assessment.	 Second,	 the	 Act	 defines	
environmental	 effects	 narrowly	 to	only	 include	 some	effects	within	 federal	 jurisdiction.	 Third,	






















environmental	 assessment	 requirements,	 subject	 to	 the	 residual	 discretion	 of	 the	Minister	 of	
the	 Environment	 to	 order	 an	 environmental	 assessment	 for	 a	 project	 not	 otherwise	
designated.53	However,	even	designated	projects	can	be	exempt	 from	a	 federal	environmental	
assessment	 if	 they	 undergo	 an	 equivalent	 provincial	 assessment.54	The	 previous	 legislation	
essentially	required	an	assessment	for	any	project	that	required	the	exercise	of	federal	authority	
(e.g.	 an	 approval	 from	 Fisheries	 and	 Oceans	 to	 alter	 fish	 habitat).55	The	 default	 under	 the	
previous	legislation,	in	other	words,	was	that	a	project	was	included	in	the	regime,	unless	it	was	
specifically	 excluded. 56 	In	 contrast,	 CEAA	 2012	 reverses	 this	 default	 rule;	 only	 projects	
specifically	designated	as	“in”	potentially	require	federal	assessment.57		
	
CEAA	 2012	 further	 narrows	 the	 role	 of	 environmental	 assessment	 by	 requiring	 the	
Canadian	 Environmental	 Assessment	 Agency	 (CEA	 Agency)	 to	 make	 an	 initial	 decision	 about	
whether	any	designated	project	in	fact	requires	an	assessment.58	Even	designated	projects	may	






The	 result	 has	 been	 a	 striking	 reduction	 in	 the	 number	 of	 federal	 environmental	
assessments	 conducted	 each	 year.	 The	 immediate	 effect	 of	 CEAA	 2012	 was	 to	 cancel	
approximately	 3,000	 ongoing	 assessments.59	Since	 then,	 the	 number	 of	 completed	 federal	
environmental	 assessments	 has	 dropped	 from	 over	 6,000	 annually	 under	 the	 previous	
legislation60	to	only	about	a	dozen	each	year.61	This	is	because	the	lowest	level	of	assessment,	a	




















was	eliminated	by	CEAA	2012.	When	a	project	 is	determined	 to	 require	an	assessment	under	
CEAA	2012,	it	now	proceeds	either	through	a	standard	“assessment”63	or	a	“panel	review.”64		
	
Second,	 CEAA	 2012	 redefines	 the	 “environmental	 effects”	 to	 be	 considered	 in	 an	
environmental	 assessment.	 The	 previous	 legislation	 defined	 environmental	 effects	 broadly	 to	
include	 “any	 change	 that	 the	 project	may	 cause	 in	 the	 environment.”65	The	 courts	 have	 held	
that	 it	 was	 constitutionally	 permissible	 for	 federal	 departments	 to	 consider	 environmental	
effects	even	when	those	effects	were	subjects	of	provincial	jurisdiction.66	In	contrast,	CEAA	2012	
defines	 environmental	 effects	 only	 as	 some	 components	 of	 the	 environment	 within	 federal	
jurisdiction	 (e.g.	 fish	 and	 fish	 habitat,	 migratory	 birds,	 changes	 to	 federal	 lands,	 effects	 on	
aboriginal	peoples).67	The	definition	of	environmental	effects	“covers	only	a	small	fraction	of	the	







assessment	 by	 the	 province	 and	 federal	 government	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 result	 in	 a	 fulsome	
assessment	of	a	proposal’s	environmental	effects.	
	
CEAA	 2012	 has	 extensive	 implications	 for	 public	 participation.	 The	 most	 significant	
change	 is	 the	 reduction	 in	 the	 number	 of	 environmental	 assessments,	 which	 removes	
consideration	of	these	project	proposals	from	the	public	sphere.	Under	the	previous	legislation,	
projects	subject	to	screenings	at	least	required	online,	publicly-accessible	records	of	the	project	
and	 assessment.71	Since	 the	 vast	majority	 of	 these	 projects	 no	 longer	 fall	 under	 the	 scope	 of	
federal	environmental	assessment,	there	is	no	public	notice	of	the	proposal.	And	it	is	not	safe	to	






















requirements,74	CEAA	 2012	 narrowly	 redefines	 a	 class	 of	 participant,	 the	 “interested	 party.”75	
Only	 if	 an	 individual	 is	 an	 interested	 party,	 that	 is	 “directly	 affected…[or]	 has	 relevant	
information	or	expertise,”76	is	she/he	entitled	to	full	participation	in	a	panel	review.	
	
The	 benefits	 of	 public	 participation	 in	 environmental	 assessment	 have	 been	 widely	
noted.77	Historically,	public	participants	have	proven	to	be	the	“most	motivated	and	often	most	
effective	 in	 ensuring	 careful	 and	 critical	 review	 of	 project	 proposals	 and	 associated	




The	 massive	 reduction	 in	 public	 participation	 under	 CEAA	 2012	 will	 lead	 to	 poorer	
environmental	decisions,	but	it	also	sends	a	strong	signal	about	whose	interests	really	matter	in	
Harper’s	 vision	 of	 the	 environment.	 The	 changes	 disproportionately	 undermine	 Indigenous	
participation,	groups	who	are	often	the	most	closely	affected	by	development	projects,	and	who	
often	already	 face	 substantial	barriers	 to	participation	due	 to	 remote	 locations	and/or	 lack	of	
resources	and	capacity	to	effectively	intervene.79	Moreover,	CEAA	2012	excludes	or	marginalizes	
individuals	and	groups	with	issue-specific	concerns,	such	as	climate	change.80	The	result	 is	that	































a	 post-planning	 regulatory	 hoop	 inevitably	 under	 pressure	 for	 speedy	 decisions	 that	 do	 not	
require	 substantial	 changes	 to	 the	 established	 plans.” 84 	The	 Act,	 in	 his	 view,	 “gets	 its	
streamlining	 chiefly	 by	undermining	 effectiveness.”85	The	 result,	 in	 other	words,	 is	 a	 legacy	of	




III. The	 Legacy	 Part	 II:	 Eroding	 the	 Commitment	 to	 a	 Democratic	 Conception	 of	 the	
Rule	of	Law	
	






because	 of	 the	 special	 quasi-constitutional	 role	 of	 environmental	 assessment	 law	 in	 enabling	
public	justification,	the	changes	to	federal	environmental	assessment	ought	to	be	understood	as	
an	attempt	to	exempt	environmental	decision-making	from	the	requirements	of	the	rule	of	law.	
Third,	 reframing	 existing	 critiques	 of	 CEAA	 2012	 in	 rule-of-law	 terms	 provides	 a	 basis	 for	
understanding	 the	 ongoing	 obligations	 of	 our	 public	 institutions	with	 respect	 to	 the	 deficient	
legislation.		
	
The	 rule	 of	 law,	 as	 is	 often	 noted,	 is	 an	 “essentially	 contested	 concept.” 86 	The	
conception	of	the	rule	of	law	advanced	here	is	the	idea	that	public	officials	must	publicly	justify	



















the	 practice	 of	 giving	 reasons.	 Two	 of	 these	 common	 law	 principles	 are	 fairness	 and	
reasonableness,	which	 are	 expressed	 through	basic	 administrative	 law	 requirements	 enforced	
by	 judicial	 review.	Together	they	give	rise	to	an	obligation	on	public	officials	 to	publicly	 justify	
their	decisions	on	 the	basis	of	 these	principles.	That	 is,	public	officials	must	demonstrate	 that	
their	decisions	are	both	fair	and	reasonable.		
	
The	 requirement	 of	 public	 justification	 has	 been	 repeatedly,	 though	 imperfectly,	
identified	by	 the	 Supreme	Court	 of	 Canada.	 The	 fullest	 expression	of	 a	 requirement	 of	 public	
justification	was	by	the	Court	in	Baker,	which	imposed	an	obligation	on	administrative	officials,	
in	 some	 instances,	 to	 offer	 reasons	 for	 their	 decisions	 that	 demonstrate	 that	 they	 exercised	
discretion	in	accordance	with	core	principles	of	Canadian	law.88		The	Court’s	watershed	decision	
in	 Dunsmuir	 later	 highlighted	 the	 role	 of	 reasonableness	 review	 in	 ensuring	 “justification,	
transparency	and	intelligibility	within	the	decision-making	process.”89	
	
These	 core	 common	 law	 principles	 are	 constitutional	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 are	
constitutive	of	law.	In	Dyzenhaus’s	words,	“you	cannot	have	rule	by	law	without	rule	of	law.”90	
Put	 differently,	 it	 is	 compliance	 with	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 (i.e.	 public	 justification	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
common	law	principles)	that	gives	a	public	decision	the	quality	of	law.	Legislation	that	conforms	
to	Fuller’s	well-known	 indicia	of	 the	 rule	of	 law	 (publicity,	 generality,	prospectivity,	etc)	 is	 the	
first	 step	 in	 complying	 with	 the	 requirement	 of	 public	 justification	 because	 it	 puts	 the	


















The	 rule	of	 law,	on	 this	 view,	 is	 constitutive	of	a	particular	 relationship	between	 legal	
subject,	the	individual	subject	to	the	law,	and	lawmaker.	Compliance	with	the	rule	of	law	means	
law	 is	 in	 a	 form	 that	 legal	 subjects	 can	understand,	deliberate	upon	and	 contest	on	 the	basis	
that	 it	 does	 not	 reflect	 core	 constitutional	 principles.	 It	 allows,	 in	 other	words,	 individuals	 to	
“reason	with	 the	 law.”93	Importantly,	 however,	 this	 conception	of	 the	 rule	of	 law	 can	only	 be	
realized	within	a	deliberative	democracy,94	in	which	individuals	expect	every	exercise	of	power	
to	be	 justified	and	“in	which	 leadership	given	by	government	rests	on	the	cogency	of	the	case	
offered	 in	 defence	 of	 its	 decisions,	 not	 the	 fear	 inspired	 by	 the	 force	 at	 its	 command.”95	It	 is	
therefore	 a	 democratic	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 because	 individual	 participation	 is	
simultaneously	essential	to	its	realization	and	enabled	by	its	fulfillment.	
	
The	 public-justification	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 imposes	 on	 environmental	
decision-makers	 obligations	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 their	 decisions	 are	 reasonable	 and	 fair.96	In	
other	words,	reasonable,	 informed	environmental	decisions	that	are	procedurally	 fair	 to	those	
affected	are	requirements	of	the	rule	of	law.	When	environmental	decisions	comply	with	these	
requirements	 they	 have	 the	 authority	 of	 law. 97 	From	 this	 perspective,	 environmental	
assessment	 performs	 a	 quasi-constitutional	 role	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 environmental	 assessment,	
when	 it	 enables	public	 participation	 and	 generates	 reasoned	decisions,	 is	 constitutive	of	 legal	




We	 are	 now	 in	 position	 to	 see	 how	 the	 extensive	 changes	 to	 federal	 environmental	
assessment	law	not	only	undermine	environmental	protection;	they	can	also	be	interpreted	as	
an	 attempt	 to	 exempt	 environmental	 decision-making	 from	 the	 fundamental	 rule-of-law	















justification	 is	 that	 the	vast	majority	of	 federal	 environmental	decisions	now	proceed	without	
having	 first	 undergone	a	 federal	 environmental	 assessment.	 The	 result	 is	 that	 these	decisions	
are	 made	 with	 minimal	 legal	 constraints	 on	 environmental	 decision-makers.	 Permits	 and	
approvals	 for	 pollution	 and	 environmental	 degradation	 are	 made	 without	 any	 public	 notice,	
public	 input,	 reasons	 for	 the	 decision	 and,	 consequently,	 no	 opportunity	 for	 independent	
review.98		
	
Even	where	an	assessment	does	occur,	 it	 is	not	clear	 that	 the	 legislative	requirements	
can	 produce	 publicly-justified	 decisions.	 For	 example,	 the	 Act’s	 explicit	 requirement	 that	 the	
effects	 of	 a	 project	 be	 “justified	 in	 the	 circumstances”	 cannot,	 in	 its	 current	 form,	 amount	 to	
adequate	 public	 justification.	 Public	 justification	 requires	 decisions	 to	 be	 reasonable,	 i.e.	
supported	by	 reasons	 that	 reflect	 the	purposes	of	 the	 legislation	and	 relevant	 considerations.	
The	narrow	definition	of	environmental	effects	renders	the	Act’s	purpose,	“to	encourage	federal	
authorities	to	take	actions	that	promote	sustainable	development	in	order	to	achieve	a	healthy	
environment	 and	 a	 healthy	 economy”99	meaningless.	 A	 “healthy	 environment”	 is	 one	 that	
includes	 far	 more	 than	 the	 highly	 circumscribed	 environmental	 effects	 defined	 in	 the	 Act.	
Moreover,	 any	 justification	 decision	 is	 inevitably	 based	 on	 a	 disproportionate	 balancing	 of	
economic	 benefits	 and	 environmental	 harm,	 where	 the	 government	 (presumably)	 takes	 into	
account	all	possible	economic	benefits100	but	only	the	environmental	effects	that	engage	federal	




Framing	CEAA	2012	 in	 rule-of-law	terms	also	reveals	 that	Harper’s	process	of	enacting	
new	 legislation	 through	 unprecedentedly	 large	 omnibus	 bills	was	 entirely	 consistent	with	 the	
substance	 of	 the	 new	 legislation.	 On	 one	 level,	 the	 rationale	 both	 for	 the	 use	 of	 omnibus	
legislation	and	 the	overhaul	 in	environmental	assessment	was	economic	stimulus.	On	another	
level,	they	can	both	be	understood	as	attempts	to	undermine	the	commitment	to	a	democratic	
conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 The	 requirement	 of	 public	 justification	 sits	 at	 the	 interface	
between	 the	 rule	of	 law	and	deliberative	democracy.	This	means	 that	 legislators	 are	not	only	
political	 actors	 within	 a	 deliberative	 democracy	 that	 generate	 reasons	 that	 they	 hope	 their	
constituents	will	accept.	They	are	also	legal	actors	who	perform	a	legal	role	by	putting	in	motion	














terms?	 After	 all,	CEAA	 2012	 is	 a	 legally	 valid	 statute	 even	 if,	 as	 this	 account	 argues,	 it	 has	 a	
questionable	claim	to	 legal	authority.	Yet,	the	public-justification	conception	of	the	rule	of	 law	




legal	 protections	 they	 can	…	because	 they	are	working	 as	 judges	within	 a	 legal	 order,	
and	 not	 as	 some	 other	 kind	 of	 official	 in	 some	 other	 kind	 of	 order;	 for	 example,	 the	
order	 Fuller	 described	 as	 managerial,	 in	 which	 the	 point	 of	 its	 structures	 is	 to	 make	





most	 rigorous	 form	 of	 environmental	 assessment)	 have	 a	 legal	 obligation	 to	 justify	 decisions	
that	exclude	individuals	on	the	basis	that	they	are	not	“interested	parties”	under	the	legislation.	
That	specific	justification	would	have	to	reflect	the	Act’s	purpose	of	“provid[ing]	for	meaningful	





decision	under	section	52	of	CEAA	2012	 is	 reasonable	 in	 the	absence	of	any	reasons	 justifying	
that	 decision.104	In	 instances	 where	 reasons	 have	 been	 offered	 and	 they	 demonstrate	 the	
legislated	bias	against	a	comprehensive	consideration	of	environmental	effects,	then	the	court	
ought	to	make	a	clear	statement	that	the	decision	formally	complies	with	the	legislation,	but	the	
legislation	 undermines	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 executive	 to	 make	 publicly	 justified	 decisions	 in	
accordance	with	the	rule	of	law.	The	effect	would	be	that	the	decision	is	legally	valid,	but	much	
like	 in	 the	 case	 of	 an	 Act	 covered	 by	 the	 notwithstanding	 clause,	 or	 a	 declaration	 of	











In	 sum,	 this	 part	 has	 argued	 that	 environmental	 assessment	 is	 quasi-constitutional	 in	
the	sense	that	it	is	an	indispensible	site	of	public	justification	in	federal	environmental	decision-
making.	 It	 argued	 that	 part	 of	 Harper’s	 legacy,	 by	 enacting	 CEAA	 2012,	 fundamentally	
undermined	 the	 possibility	 of	 publicly	 justified	 environmental	 decisions.	 CEAA	 2012	 can	
therefore	be	understood	as	an	attempt,	by	the	Conservative-dominated	Parliament,	to	exempt	
environmental	 decision-making	 from	 democratic	 governance	 under	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 Finally,	
understanding	the	changes	to	CEAA	2012	in	this	way	shows	how	it	is	possible,	and	indeed	a	rule-
of-law	 imperative,	 for	 the	 institutions	 tasked	with	 implementing	 and	 enforcing	CEAA	 2012	 to	





This	 article	 argued	 that	 Harper’s	 legacy	 in	 environmental	 law	 has	 been	 to	 undermine	
environmental	protection	and	publicly-justified	environmental	decision-making.	In	conclusion,	it	
is	 worth	 looking	 ahead	 to	 see	what	 of	 this	 legacy	might	 survive	 the	 next	 government,	which	
campaigned	 on	 a	 radically	 different	 approach.	 I	 offer	 one	 prediction	 and	 one	 caution.	 The	
prediction	 is	 that	we	should	expect	 to	see	a	much	stronger	 role	 for	 Indigenous	environmental	
assessments	in	Canadian	environmental	law.	A	significant	byproduct	of	Harper’s	environmental	
legacy	was	the	galvanization	of	environmental	resistance	by	Indigenous	Canadians	through	the	
Idle	 No	 More	 movement. 105 	Moreover,	 in	 a	 direct	 response	 to	 the	 changes	 to	 federal	
environmental	assessment	law,	many	Indigenous	groups	have	begun	to	codify	and	enforce	their	
own	 Indigenous	 environmental	 assessment	 laws,	 which	 unsurprisingly	 contain	 fundamentally	
different	approaches	 to	environmental	assessment.106	The	Tsleil-Waututh	Nation,	 for	example,	
conceives	 of	 environmental	 assessment	 as	 a	 means	 to	 discharge	 responsibility	 to	 land	 and	
future	generations	and	to	determine	the	best	use	of	land.107	They	call	for	comprehensive	socio-
ecological	assessment	that	eschews	any	strong	division	between	people	and	the	environment.108	
This	 is	 a	 welcome	 development	 for	 Canadian	 environmental	 law,	 but	 one	 that	 undoubtedly	














with	 respect	 to	major	projects	 such	as	pipelines,	many	of	 the	 legal	 changes	 to	environmental	
assessment	 are	 subtler.	 In	 addition,	 these	 changes	 are	 consistent	 with	 the	 well-worn	
characterization	 of	 environmental	 assessment	 as	 a	 purely	 formal	 and	mechanical	 exercise.	 A	
“streamlined”	 federal	 environmental	 assessment	 regime	 is	 entirely	 consistent	 with	 this	
characterization.	While	the	new	government	has	promised	environmental	assessment	reform,109	
the	 stop-gap	 measures	 proposed	 by	 the	 Trudeau	 government	 for	 two	 major	 interprovincial	
pipeline	proposals	may,	in	this	vein,	prove	prophetic.	These	measures	create	an	additional	step,	
after	the	CEAA	2012-assessment,	 in	which	the	government	will	conduct	 its	own	assessment	of	
the	 upstream	greenhouse	 gas	 emissions	 associated	with	 the	 pipelines	 and	 conduct	 additional	
aboriginal	consultation.110	In	no	way	does	this	address	the	real	problem	of	CEAA	2012,	which	is	
its	 inability	 to	generate	 fair	 and	 reasoned	decisions.	This	article	 suggests	 that	 the	way	 for	 the	
Trudeau	environmental	legacy	to	supersede	Harper’s	is	to	begin	by	conceiving	of	environmental	
assessment	as	 the	 linchpin	 to	 its	 commitment	 to	environmental	governance	under	 the	 rule	of	
law.	
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